Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press
are prepared by the Government Press Office
as a service to foreign journalists in Israel.
They express the views of the authors.
Within the Framework of the Rules of the Game
(Analysis by Alex Fishman, "Yediot Ahronot", Aug 17, 1999, p. 2)
Hizballah is liable to look for revenge by "selectively firing" Katyushas,
attempting headline-grabbing attacks in southern Lebanon in the coming
days or by concentrated attacks on IDF and SLA positions.
The elimination of military leaders has been part of the rules of the game
in southern Lebanon for years. More than this it is a permanent and
mutual policy.
Israel and Hizballah routinely gather information on each others'
commanders, and constantly search for ways to hit at them. Only two weeks
ago, pictures and names of IDF commanders were discovered in a Hizballah
cache in the western part of the security zone. These pictures, it should
be noted, were not being gathered for the historical record. Hizballah
commanders constantly change their routes and check their cars, out of
fear of explosive devices. They know very well that they are potential
targets for assassination.
In a war like that being conducted in southern Lebanon, the assassination
of a military commander has much greater moral and operational
significance than in other forms of combat, and both sides know this. When
Hizballah killed Brigadier-General Erez Gerstein, they saw this, according
to their public declarations, as a legitimate operation within the "Grapes
of Wrath" understandings. The fact that Hassan Salameh, killed yesterday,
was a senior military commander, connected to the second level of the
organisation's hierarchy was not apparently sufficient to stop the
heads of the organisation from threatening revenge.
A different possible form of Hizballah response might have been to have
fired Katyushas at unpopulated areas, and to have tested the Israeli
response. If firing of this kind was carried out, and the IDF did not
respond in line with the norm set on June 24 (when the IAF attacked
infrastructure targets in Lebanon) then Israel would suffer serious
strategic damage, and would return to the same low point in its deterrent
capacity at which it stood prior to those attacks.
If not by Katyushas, the Hizballah will seek its revenge through a
large-scale terrorist attack in southern Lebanon in the coming days, or in
a concentrated attack on IDF and SLA positions.
The order of the day in Israeli policy in Lebanon is to maintain quiet.
The elimination of a senior military commander, which is liable to set the
area ablaze with fighting, does not exactly jibe with the possibility of
starting a dialogue with the Syrians. But because Israel did not take
responsibility for the assassination, the issue of the prudence behind the
action is not, as it were, on the agenda.