Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press
are prepared by the Government Press Office
as a service to foreign journalists in Israel.
They express the views of the authors.
Southern Lebanon: The Rules of the Game Are Changing
(Article by Ron Ben-Yishai, "Yediot Ahronot", Weekend Supplement, July 30,
1999, p.10)
"This quiet worries me," Lt.-Col. T. told OC Northern Command Gabi
Ashkenazi, who came to visit an IDF outpost deep inside the Security Zone
last week. "This quiet generally ends with us being attacked from an
unexpected direction," he said. Ashkenazi nodded in agreement, ordering
the soldiers at the outpost not to let down their guard because of the
virtual calm. The fact that Hizballah has, of late, reduced the scope of
its shelling does not mean that the Shi'ite organization has stopped
fighting; it only means that Hizballah has adapted its tactics to these
restrictions recently imposed upon them by the Syrians. Instead of firing
on outposts from a distance and from within villages which could cause
an escalation which Damascus does not currently desire Hizballah is now
concentrating on efforts to break the SLA and the IDF with the deadly
explosive charges it scatters along area roads.
Two hours after the OC Northern Command's visit, a bomb exploded along the
fence marking the border with Lebanon, just 20 meters from a bus driving
along a highway in northern Israel.
In the past, Hizballah had almost completely refrained from carrying out
attacks along the border fence and against the communities or highway
adjacent thereto. Official Hizballah policy maintains that the
organization only fights against the "Israeli occupation" in southern
Lebanon, and the Grapes of Wrath understandings also prohibit attacks
against Israeli territory which is why last Thursday's attack was a
concern-provoking exception. The attack was directed at a bus packed with
soldiers and, had it not failed, the Jewish people would have had another
reason to fast on Tisha B'Av. Israel would have apparently responded in
anger, that is, with another series of destructive strikes against
infrastructure targets inside Lebanon.
Such a development would run totally against the Syria's current interest
in preventing any escalation, at least until Barak's intentions regarding
the Golan are clarified. Why then did Hizballah decide to test Israel and
possibly even its Syrian patrons?
There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, the mine may have been
planted by Hizballah in order to sabotage Syria's plans to resume its
negotiations with Israel and only the ineptitude of the assailants
spared the potential casualties.
The logic in such a move, which would have been liable to embroil
Hizballah in a clash with Syria, derives from the fear of Hizballah
leaders of the day when an agreement is reached between Syria and Israel.
Sheikh Nasrallah and his deputies, as well as Hizballah's patron
ayatollahs in Tehran, know that Syria will impose disarmament upon
Hizballah as soon as such a treaty is signed. Hizballah is prepared to lay
down its weapons and to integrate itself into Lebanon's civilian
establishment as a source of political power, but only on condition that
the world, and particularly the Lebanese, recognize that Hizballah (and
not the Syrians) expelled the IDF from Lebanon and crushed the SLA. Only
then can Hizballah demand senior standing on the Lebanese political stage.
And when speaking of the existential interests of Hizballah and the
Shi'ite community, Hizballah leaders, at the encouragement of Iran, are
even prepared to risk angering Assad.
The second possibility is that the the explosives were planted with the
consent of the Syrians, with the goal of showing Israel what is liable to
occur if the IDF unilaterally withdraws from the Security Zone. It should
be remembered that, at the start of that week, the Israeli media reported
that Barak intends to extract the IDF from the Security Zone within one
year even if no agreement is reached with the Syrians. These reports
almost certainly energized a number of people in Damascus, where it is
feared that the Lebanese card will be lost if the IDF should withdraw
before reaching any prior accord with Syria. This scenario was suggested
by the fact that no damage was caused by the explosives detonated along
the border fence; Hizballah may have intentionally activated the bomb once
the bus was at a safe distance just to signal Israel, without taking
the risk of reprisals.
First Operational Decision
The defense establishment considered various responses to the incident. A
number of senior IDF officers charged that, regardless of Hizballah's
intent, we must not restrain ourselves in the face of such a blatant
violation of the written and tacit understandings with Hizballah.
According to senior IDF General Staff officers, the restraint that
Netanyahu demonstrated during the election campaign, and immediately
thereafter, cost us dearly. Barak, who was required to make his first
operational decision as prime minister and defense minister, nevertheless
decided against a harsh military response apparently concerned that, in
the absence of casualties, it would be difficult to make international
public opinion understand why Israel was destroying civilian Lebanese
infrastructure targets. Another motive was Barak's desire not to be viewed
as trying to sabotage the chances of resuming the negotiations with Syria.
The IDF did not protest the decision. The Chief-of-Staff and the General
Staff commanders understand that, until the fate of the negotiations with
Syria becomes clear, the IDF has two supreme missions in Lebanon: In
addition to protecting the communities of the Galilee, the IDF must give
the political echelon the freedom to act and maneuver in order to exhaust
the potential of negotiations with Syria. It is thus reasonable to assume
that any decision which the politicians (i.e. Barak) make in favor of
negotiations, even if it should contradict professional military wisdom
such as in the case of not responding to the Tisha B'Av bomb will be
accepted with understanding by the IDF.
For the same reason, the IDF also supported Barak's decision to resume the
discussions of the Monitoring Committee. But so the IDF does not find
itself in an impossible situation where it is forced to execute its
duties with its hands tied Barak first clarified to the Syrians, via
President Clinton, that he will be prepared to make difficult and painful
decisions, but that he will not negotiate with Syria as long as Hizballah
continues firing Katyushas against the Galilee. Damascus knows that Barak
believes Rabin and Peres were wrong to continue political contacts with
Syria at a time when Kiryat Shmona residents were being forced into bomb
shelters.
This message, together with the impression left in Lebanon and Syria after
the 24 June bombing of infrastructure targets in Lebanon, has caused the
Syrians to impose certain restrictions on Hizballah activity. But the
placement of mines continues, and is even intensifying, and now
constitutes the primary threat to the political negotiations, the
stability of the Security Zone and the lives of IDF and SLA soldiers.
Balloons, Dogs and Boar Sensors
In this new situation, the IDF is being asked to prevent Hizballah from
scoring achievements in two spheres.
Firstly, the IDF is being asked to prevent, or at least minimize, the
losses caused to our forces and to the SLA by explosive charges. This is
necessary not only because human life is precious, but also to prevent the
occurrence of situations in which Israel must use force in responding to
violence from Lebanon. Losses in Lebanon are liable to pressure Israeli
public opinion into conceding to the Syrians or into leaving Lebanon
without an agreement that guarantees the welfare of communities in the
Galilee region.
Thus far, the IDF and the SLA have been relatively successful in
contending with the mines; since the beginning of the year, Hizballah set
traps in 45 different locations, containing over 100 explosive charges,
have been uncovered. Only in four instances were the mines activated,
causing six of the IDF's ten fatalities in Lebanon this year. The high
rate of success in exposing Hizballah mines can be attributed to, among
other factors, the sophisticated technological means that the IDF has used
in the Security Zone of late. The Lebanese media has spoken of balloons
with on-board cameras that watch from the sky, of dogs that sniff-out and
warn against mines, of electronic sensors installed in wadis, and of video
cameras suspended on poles in areas where the outposts do not have visual
reach. One Lebanese newspaper recently reported that the IDF has installed
acoustic sensors on wild boars which wander through the same wadis as
Hizballah personnel. According to the Beirut paper, the sensors transmit
the unique grunts which the boars make when encountering people
directly to IDF outposts. There is certainly a large degree of
exaggeration in these stories, but they do contain a grain, if not more,
of truth.
The second, urgent IDF mission is to stabilize the Security Zone and to
prevent the collapse of the SLA. Of the 50 outposts in the Security Zone,
the IDF maintains only eight, while the rest are staffed by the SLA. Most
of the mines found, and still being found, in the Security Zone were (and
are being) discovered by the SLA which has suffered the brunt of the
losses. The inevitable conclusion is that, if the SLA collapses, the IDF
will be compelled to withdraw without either negotiations or a settlement.
For now, the SLA is holding firm. Contrary to the negative forecasts, the
withdrawal from Jezzine did not create a "domino effect" and there were
fewer than 20 SLA defectors. But Barak's declaration of intent on bringing
the IDF out of Lebanon has caused many SLA servicemen and Security Zone
residents to take account of their personal situations. More than a few of
them are inclined to cooperate with Hizballah, fearing that they will
otherwise be harmed when Israel withdraws; one proof of this was the
charge planted along the border fence last week which the IDF is
convinced was planted by, or with the active assistance of, a gang
comprised of Security Zone residents. This was not the first such
instance, nor will it apparently be the last, in the current period. As a
consequence, there is a tendency among IDF soldiers serving in the
Security Zone to be suspicious of SLA personnel and to limit contact with
them.
As we approach the end of the year within which Barak has committed to
evacuate the Security Zone, and if there is no evidence of a settlement
which guarantees the future of SLA members, there is a genuine danger that
instances of cooperation with Hizballah, and of defection from the ranks
of the SLA, will increase into a full blown wave.
In order to stem this tide, the IDF is working on a number of fronts:
Large-scale protective improvements are being made at SLA outposts, in an
effort to offer their occupants the same level of security provided to IDF
soldiers; SLA commanders are being given new, protected vehicles to
transport them and their people on area roads; SLA personnel are being
given new weapons, similar to those recently introduced in the IDF, and;
SLA salaries were recently increased by $100 to $300, depending on rank.
But IDF sources are saying that this is insufficient and more must be
done, even if additional millions must be supplemented to the budget
allocated for maintaining the Security Zone.
Furthermore, in order to instill confidence in SLA personnel, and in order
to prevent them from collapsing as a fighting force, the political echelon
must intervene. According to commanders in the region, Barak must
explicitly tell them that under no circumstances will Israel neglect them
or leave them to the mercy of Hizballah.
Increase in the Number of Absent Soldiers
The IDF's third challenge is to maintain the morale and motivation of its
soldiers in the Security Zone. Many soldiers are already being pressured
by their parents, who are saying that there is no reason to endanger
themselves when the IDF will clearly be withdrawing from Lebanon within a
few months. As a result of this pressure, there has been a small, but
noted increase in the absentee rates among those units headed for Lebanon.
For the time being, there are only a few cases, but this small trend is
liable to become a larger phenomenon as the withdrawal nears. The IDF must
prepare itself for this possibility, and prevent it through an intensive
information campaign and various forms of compensation.