Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press
are prepared by the Government Press Office
as a service to foreign journalists in Israel.
They express the views of the authors.
Periodic Boiling Point
(Commentary by Ofer Shelah, "Ma'ariv", Mar 1, 1999, p. A2)
IDF commanders in Lebanon know the scenario well: every so often, the
forces operating there reach a periodic boiling point. The growing effort
within the IDF to reduce the number of wounded fails in a specific
instance or in a series of incidents. The Israeli public feels helpless,
the system is tired of saying that there is a war in Lebanon and that that
is the way things are in war. And then as in 1993 and 1996 comes a
great twist, full of fire, that is intended not to change the situation
substantively but rather mostly to restore the scoreboard, theirs and
ours, to a course with which we can somehow live.
Despite all the pain, we must admit: yesterday, Hizballah scored one of
its greatest achievements by a guerrilla organization a direct hit on a
senior enemy commander. And it is no use making explanations, such as the
late Brig.-Gen. Erez Gerstein, one of the army's best field fighters and a
commander who knew the sector like the back of his hand, changed his
travel plan the night before last; the commander of the IDF Liaison Unit
in Lebanon was marked by Hizballah even in the time of Gerstein's
predecessor, Brig.-Gen. Eli Amitai, and now the question of whether the
attackers actually knew that Gerstein was there is meaningless. What is
clear is that the type and location of the attack shatter the illusion
if anyone had such an illusion that there is a "red line" in the
security zone and relative quiet behind it. Every kilometer of road is a
front, every house is a danger.
And another thing: Hizballah acted in the morning in the framework of the
Grapes of Wrath understandings (which came after the firing of Katyushas,
which was a violation of the understandings). The Israeli response is
proof that over time we are finding it difficult to live with these
understandings. Defense Minister Moshe Arens said similar things to
Ma'ariv on Friday and there is no doubt that Arens, as opposed to
Mordechai, views the current situation as something that can and should be
changed.
The prime minister spoke yesterday about a move of "growing intensity." It
is reasonable to assume that how things develop depends, first of all, on
Hizballah itself. If the organization responds by firing Katyushas, there
will be more bombings, and so forth and so on, according to the damage
that is caused and the number of civilians who are harmed on both sides.
This was Israel's policy in previous instances as well and it pins our
actions in Lebanon to the lucky or unlucky location of the shell's
landing. This is just about the range of Israel's policy in southern
Lebanon.
Yesterday did not involve Syria in the matter, at least not according to
the stated plan. However, it is at least worth bearing in mind the words
of the defense minister, according to which "the Syrians are conducting a
proxy war in Lebanon." And these are the parameters according to which
matters will now develop: the amount of damage to civilians on both sides,
the question of whether or not the Syrians will be involved and, finally,
the question of who will get fed up first. And afterward, the war in
Lebanon will return to being what it is, in the framework of one set of
understandings or another, until the next crisis.