Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press are prepared by the Government Press Office as a service to foreign journalists in Israel. They express the views of the authors.
Israel is Confusing Assad
(Commentary by Moshe Zak, "Ma'ariv", Jan 4, 1999, p. B6)
The Syrian president is satisfied by the rejection of the proposal for a
unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, but disappointed that the
responsibility has been placed on Beirut.
What was the logic behind the publication of last Friday's security
cabinet decision that the firing of Katyusha rockets at the Galilee would
lead to attacks on targets in Lebanon? What was different about the
cabinet decision? Has the IAF been until now banned from reacting to
Katyusha fire by attacking deep into Lebanon? And were the IAF bombing of
Hizballah bases in Lebanon's Beka'a Valley and the seaborne and ground
raids carried out contrary to government instructions?
If the intention was to land more painful blows, why was it necessary to
announce it in advance and escalate the continuing verbal confrontation?
Why not wait until the time when it would be necessary to tangibly prove
to Hizballah that Israel can respond with more severe measures? What did
this warning add to all of the previous Israeli warnings? Was the entire
uproar worthwhile merely to encourage Hizballah's leader to brag that he
had caused Shimon Peres' downfall in the wake of his response to Operation
Grapes of Wrath?
For 50 years, it was agreed that decisions on planned military steps would
not be publicized prior to their being carried out. There were times when
we were prohibited from even publicizing the fact that the Ministerial
Committee on National Security had met. And now, the future reaction is
officially made public, as is the semi-official explanation that the
intention is to hit strategic targets in Lebanon, as per the suggestion of
the public security minister, i.e. the electricity grid, bridges and
ports.
The cabinet decision to reject the proposal for a unilateral IDF
withdrawal from Lebanon could be interpreted by Hafez Assad as a signal
that Israel understands that, without Syria, it will be unable to
implement the withdrawal from Lebanon unilaterally or through indirect
negotiations with Lebanon via western intermediaries. In Syria's view,
Israel will need to speak to Damascus regarding anything related to
Lebanon, and in this way, it will also be able to add the negotiations on
the form of Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the account.
However, the addition in the cabinet statement that, "Israel holds the
Lebanese government directly responsible for what goes on in southern
Lebanon and demands that it cease acting against Israel," reshuffled the
cards held by Syria, which had hoped that Israel would build a bridge for
it to Washington, through negotiations on a ceasefire in southern Lebanon.
Apart from the attempt to turn the roadside mines in Lebanon into a
springboard to a dialogue with the U.S., Assad is also looking to achieve
by way of this the final, definite consent by the Americans and Israelis
to Syria's exclusive domination of Lebanon. Assad remembers the days when
he needed Israeli agreement for the deployment of Syrian army units up to
a certain line in southern Lebanon. The Syrian ruler has also not
forgotten that in the American-Israeli-Lebanese agreement signed on May
17, 1983, it was stated that both the IDF and the Syrian army were
required to leave Lebanese soil.
This is what motivates Assad to support Hizballah. The new highway for
bringing military equipment from Damascus to the Beka'a Valley is filled
with Syrian trucks carrying arms and ammunition, previously brought from
Teheran to Damascus, for Hizballah. Syria is satisfied with the war of
attrition being waged by Hizballah against Israel. To accelerate the
opening of negotiations with Washington, Assad will not hesitate to use
the long arm of Hizballah, including in operations across the
international border.
Assad's calculations are complex. On the one hand he does not want to give
up the right to represent Lebanon in the negotiations with America and
Israel. After all, Syria sees Lebanon as its province, and Damascus' rule
in Lebanon is growing roots with the presence of hundreds of thousands of
Syrian workers on Lebanese soil and large numbers of military personnel,
as well as with investments and business arrangements worth hundreds of
millions. The proposal for a unilateral withdrawal of the IDF from
Lebanon, which the Israeli cabinet rejected on the recommendation of the
General Staff, suited Assad. On the other hand, the cabinet's declaration
that Israel views the Lebanese government as being directly responsible
for whatever happens in southern Lebanon, completely negates the Syrian
plan to hold negotiations with Israel with direct American involvement,
which would make a ceasefire in southern Lebanon conditional on an Israeli
withdrawal from the Golan.
Assad continues to grope in the dark. He is still not sure if Israel would
be willing to engage in dual track negotiations with him, which would
exchange calm in Lebanon for withdrawal from the Golan. In fact, Israeli
residents are in a similar state of lack of knowledge -- even after the
publication of the decisions by the security cabinet.