Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press are prepared by the Government Press Office as a service to foreign journalists in Israel. They express the views of the authors.
Israel No Longer Relies Solely on the Reservists
(Commentary by Ron Ben-Yishai, "Yediot Ahronot", Jan 13, 1999, p.11)
These are the reasons for the structural changes in the IDF.
The IDF structural changes and deployment plan that Chief of Staff Shaul
Mofaz intends to implement over the next two years is ambitious and
far-reaching -- but is made necessary due to the rapidly changing military
conditions in the region.
The "Tashbetz" Plan is meant to enable the State of Israel to withstand a
surprise attack by a neighboring state -- or a coalition of Middle Eastern
states -- under the most severe conditions. In other words, when the
surprise attack from outside is accompanied by missile attacks on the home
front and possibly guerrilla and terrorist activities carried out by
Palestinians on transportation routes within Israel.
It is clear enough that in such a situation the call-up of the reserves is
likely to be disrupted and delayed and the regular army units will also
find it difficult to move quickly between fronts as the IDF did in
previous wars. The conclusion: The IDF's regular ground and air forces
will have to be able to block the surprise attack at the front and the
home front by themselves. Later, when the reserve units are called-up, it
will be possible to use their help for the counter-attack -- if the
conditions and time left to the IDF authorities permits it.
In order for the IDF's regular forces to be able to handle this mission,
it has to be deployed in the following manner: Field units and command
posts should not have to carry out large scale administrative movements
before entering battle; the IDF in general, and the field units in
particular, must have more accurate and heavier fire- power than it
possesses today; all units must know their special missions as far as
possible, and be trained to carry them out together with other units
assigned to those missions; commanders must be experts in the fronts they
are to operate in and know the forces they are to command; and finally,
the general staff must be more functional, and the chief of staff has to
be able to command all the IDF arms in wartime, and not the ground forces
only as in past wars.
The Tashbetz Plan is an attempt to achieve all this without significantly
increasing the size of the ground forces available to the IDF, and without
significantly increasing the defense budget. The general staff intends to
mainly pay for the additions in advanced and sophisticated fighting
equipment by eliminating entire commands an thinning out command functions
and logistics. The Ground Forces Command will thus become an arm that
builds and trains all the ground forces. This will make possible the
disbanding of a considerable number of the brigade and unit level training
bases that exist today. This is also the reason that independent brigades,
like Golani, Givati and the Paratroopers are to be combined into
divisional frameworks. They will be trained within these divisional
frameworks together with the armor and artillery with whom they will go to
war, and they will receive their necessary logistical and adjunct services
from the divisions.
Low ranking soldiers will not really feel the changes, but there will be a
totally new situation for many of the senior commanders. It is the nature
of things that no commander, especially those enjoying an "independent"
status in a "private" command, will not like the changes. Therefore, the
plan is being received with mixed feelings by not a small number of
senior-middle level commanders -- brigadier-generals, colonels and
lieutenant-colonels.
These officers, expert in the internal IDF political byways, also know how
to torpedo unwanted changes with a skill that would not embarrass any
political wheeler-dealer in the civilian sector. Therefore, Mofaz
pre-empted the blow by involving all the general staff officers in the
plan's preparations, as well as a great number of their subordinates. It
now remains to be seen whether the 16th chief of staff will succeed in
carrying out something that all of his predecessors have failed to do.