Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press
are prepared by the Government Press Office
as a service to foreign journalists in Israel.
They express the views of the authors.
Exercises in the Art of War
(By Ron Ben Yishai, "Yediot Ahronot", Weekend Supplement, Aug 13, 1999,
p.18)
The Chairman of the Palestinian Authority is nervous and speaks
aggressively. Hamas and the activists get the hint: He will not oppose a
little "pressure" on Israel, which will also press the Americans. The
result: Modest attacks, such as the ones this week. The relative security
that Israel has enjoyed during the past year is not guaranteed. Barak to
Arafat: Israel will not negotiate under the shadow of terrorism.
Arafat is under pressure these days. A great deal of pressure, say
security sources who know well what goes on in the Palestinian Authority.
He had developed a high level of expectations regarding Ehud Barak and now
is not certain if they will be realized. Sharp criticism has been leveled
against him from both the Arab world and from within the Palestinian
ranks, and it seems that even the Americans have cooled their relationship
with him. As always, when Arafat is anxious, nervous and angry, the
Palestinian "street" wakes up and begins rioting and committing acts of
violence. The same sources are quick to clarify that Arafat is not the man
who directly initiated the wave of Palestinian violence that began this
month and is now gaining strength. But the recent angry and warlike
statements of the Rais and senior Palestinian officials signaled to both
Hamas leaders and Fatah street activists (the Hawks) that "modest physical
pressure" on Israel will not harm, and may even help, the Palestinian
Authority in the present critical period.
Arafat has done nothing to correct this impression, even after it became
perfectly clear that the terrorist organizations and violent institutions
loyal to the Palestinian Authority those who were under its iron
control during the period of the election and government formation had
resumed their activities. Arafat and his security chiefs know well that
they are riding a tiger that is hard to control. They are aware of the
fact that the recent shootings in Samaria and Hebron were carried out by
Hamas personnel, who were sent by their organization to torpedo the
revitalized peace process. This objective appears to be against Arafat's
general interest which actually wants the process to go forward. But it
seems that the PA Chairman believes that low- level violence is useful in
order to hint to the Israeli government and public opinion what could
happen on the ground should Wye not be implemented in both spirit and
deed, and in order to create a feeling of urgency in the American
administration.
Therefore, Arafat is not sending his security chiefs to carry out
effective pre-emptive strikes against the local cells. However, the
security forces and counterintelligence service do continue to
aggressively attack Hamas' professional hard-core in order to prevent mass
terrorist attacks which could halt the peace process in its tracks.
Barak's Warning
Approximately two months ago, a senior security official
sent an unequivocal message directly from Barak to Arafat, according to
which Israel will not agree to implement the Wye accord or continue
negotiations on the permanent settlement under the pressure of terrorism.
Arafat believes the message, but he continues to try to walk a fine line.
The division of labor is clear enough: The shootings in Samaria and Hebron
are carried out by local Hamas cells, so that Arafat can disclaim any
responsibility for their actions, without trouble; the violent
demonstrations at Netzarim junction, in Hebron and at Joseph's Tomb in
Nablus are carried out by the Fatah Hawks, who, while belonging to the
organization that Arafat heads, have their own leadership which criticizes
Arafat's policies, thus enabling him to disclaim direct responsibility for
their actions as well.
In the event that these demonstrations get out of control, Arafat can show
magnanimity towards Israel, and order his police to disperse them without
great effort. This is how he has acted in recent weeks, with not a little
success from his point of view.
What is now happening on the ground is the exact dose that Arafat
prescribes: Sporadic and not very professional or effective operations
mostly carried out against settlers or IDF forces in the territories. That
is enough to send a message.
But we have seen a clear escalating trend this week. There were two
attacks Tuesday, including the deliberate running-over of soldiers at
Nahshon Junction inside the State of Israel's territory. The conclusion is
that if the disputes between Barak and Arafat continue or even worsen, one
can expect a parallel intensification of the violence in the territories
in their current format.
A Militia Army
According to Israeli analysts, Arafat has never neglected
the use of violence and terrorism as a lever to advance his goals. The
results of the 1996 elections, which raised Netanyahu to power, taught him
that terrorism could become a two-edged sword that hurts him and prevents
him from achieving his political goals. Therefore, he is careful now, and
sends out his security apparatus to collect intelligence and to foil
specific initiatives by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad to commit massive
attacks.
His forces have reaped successes in this field recently. Security
cooperation with Israel is generally quite good, for the same reason and
same objective. But at the same time, Arafat is careful not to destroy
Hamas' infrastructure so that it can be used if necessary as a
strategic weapon of terrorism.
Arafat regards the suicide bombers who carry explosives on their bodies
into the heart of population centers the same way that Syria and Iran
regard their ballistic missiles as a strategic weapon, to be used
against the Israeli civilian homefront if the Palestinians' strategic
interests are in danger. He will use this weapon if and when he concludes
that Israel is preventing him from establishing the Palestinian state more
or less in the format that is acceptable to him. When the Hamas
infrastructure is at issue, the intention is the organization's social,
economic and religious activities which enable its leaders to recruit
fighters and send them for training abroad.
Alongside the suicide terrorism, which is Arafat's strategic weapon, the
PA Chairman has a fighting force which can be activated for guerrilla
warfare. What is called the "Palestinian National Police" is in fact a
militia army that can be used against settlements, roads and IDF bases in
the territories. The fighting that broke out after the opening of the
Western Wall Tunnel in September 1996 shows what these forces can do. The
IDF is prepared for such an eventuality, and has fortified the
settlements, but if Arafat decides to use this option it could claim many
victims from both sides.
Four factors are behind Arafat's current distress, causing him to drift
towards renewed violence. First, he is concerned that Barak is a more
sophisticated version of Netanyahu he speaks nicely but does not intend
to carry out the Wye agreements as written and prefers the Syrian channel
over the peace process with the Palestinians. Senior PA officials have
claimed to Israelis with whom they have met, that, "We gave Israel
security during the elections, enabling Barak to be elected, and now you
prefer the Syrians to us." The hint was that only one mass terrorist
attack would be enough for Israel to put the Palestinians back at the top
of the agenda.
The second factor for Arafat's feeling of distress is the fact that the
American administration, at Barak's request, has abandoned its role as
mediator and judge of Israeli-Palestinian relations, and has returned to
the role of assistant. This is a retreat, from Arafat's perspective, and
is costing him an important lever of pressure on Israel. During the
Netanyahu government, Arafat took care to restrain Hamas mainly in order
to protect the special relationship he developed with Washington. Now he
fears that his relations with Washington have returned to their earlier
format, and this is what might cause him to lose his motivation to fight
terrorism.
The third factor is the venomous criticism directed at Arafat from Arab
countries like Syria, Libya and Iran as well, and of course from the
Palestinian opposition. This is occurring at the same time that he is
trying to bring about a reconciliation with the Palestinian rejectionist
front in order to build a united front for the fateful permanent
settlement negotiations. The reconciliation is vital for him in order to
block the charge that he does not represent all Palestinians, thus
limiting his negotiating flexibility.
The pressure on him is enormous, say the analysts. The economic situation
in the territories is not improving, the Fatah field operatives are angry
with him because he gave the important and income-generating offices to
his close associates from Tunis, and only gave them the leftovers. This is
why the Hawks are challenging his rule and carrying out operations that
anger him.
Arafat is in a Hurry
In light of all this, Arafat feels he has to hurry.
He feels that his position in the territories is weakening, and that if he
does not declare a Palestinian state by May 2000, he might miss the train
and not achieve his dream to be the first president of an independent
Palestinian state. Hamas, under the leadership of Sheikh Yassin, would
build on his ruins. Hamas has so far avoided a frontal conflict with
Arafat, but it is gradually building up its power.
There can be no doubt that the joint operations of the GSS and the
Palestinian security forces have recently struck hard at Hamas'
operational ability. The organization's military ability has also been
weakened due to internal conflict between Sheikh Yassin and its leaders in
the territories, and between the organization's leaders in Jordan, Dr.
Mussa Abu-Marzouk and Khaled Masha'al, and Imad al-'Alami who operate from
Damascus and Lebanon.
The Hawk's leaders also oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state
according to Arafat's formula, and want to carry out attacks to torpedo
the peace process and force Israel to surrender under the pressure of
violence. Yassin knows that if Hamas operates on this principle, it could
drag Arafat into a war to destroy him, and cause the majority of the
population which supports Arafat's policy goals to resist him. He
therefore prefers build his economic and political power and to wait for
the moment when Hamas will inherit the PA's political apparatus and what
it has won from Israel. Then it can continue the struggle to establish an
Islamic state in the entire land of Palestine.
Hamas in the territories is obeying Yassin for now, and the organization's
leaders abroad are therefore trying to build a model for operations in the
territories based on secret, isolated and separate cells, who receive
their orders directly from Amman and Damascus. They are also trying to
give these cells the operational ability to carry out attacks using
material, means and methods not used by Palestinian terrorists up till
now, and which will enable them to carry out mass attacks inside Israeli
territory. For this purpose, they are sending terrorists from the
territories to Iran to learn new operational methods, and they even pay
the Iranians for this service. One cell of this type has already been
caught by the GSS and its members put on trial.
An additional important source of power for the militant Hamas is the
prisoners held in Israeli jails. A very senior official recently noted
that the control in Israeli prisons is, in practice, held by security
prisoners. This permits them to direct and initiate terrorist attacks and
street violence from inside the jails, with the primary objective of
pressuring Israel to release Hamas prisoners without regard to whether
they have blood on their hands or not.
In light of these facts, it can be concluded that the relative security
Israel has enjoyed during the past year is not guaranteed. It is
reasonable to assume that for a little while mainly during the
permanent settlement negotiations we are likely to face a wave of
Palestinian violence and terrorism, far more serious and dangerous that
which we have witnessed up until now.